it cannot go that bad. 10,000 is the highest. it is designed to protect people. if they could only invest 800 but with the nephew have real capital. . .

and that's iraq. it was a very contentious issue and do spend a lot of time writing about it in the book and you reiterate your thoughts that it was not a legitimate war. you write, it if 9/11 change the world the consequences that the iraq war were similarly dramatic magnitude. why did you say that? >> guest: i say that because the iraq war led to major divisions within the international communities and i'm not just talking about the u.n.. i'm talking about its impact on communities and groups in the middle east and beyond and a sense that the world has been broken into groups and some were being targeted or profiled who felt very strongly about this and this is about a bar on which the international committee was

divided. the council did not approve it and i firmly believe we should have given the inspectors, the weapons inspectors, more time to do their work in iraq and gotten back with a report to the security council but the council that heads wanted so dam -- saddam said there would be serious consequences to determine first whether they corporate it with the inspectors are not and secondly to determine what those consequences should be. obviously when it comes to use of force, and a country when attack has the right to defend itself but when it comes to broader pieces and issues one cannot do it without the unique legitimacy of the security council. >> host: but why such a lasting legacy because now that american troops have pulled out of iraq is not done and dusted

whereas of course the legacy of the stream terrorism is -- >> guest: first of all, i wouldn't say the war is dusted and done. the impact on iraq and the iraqis are rather traumatic. people are being killed in iraq every day. i was in iraq in july talking to the prime minister discussing syria and he was very -- about what was going to happen using their own experience and telling me of course the war in iraq energize the jihadist who rushed to iraq to fight and i think we are likely to see the same in syria if we don't -- 's. >> host: so there is still a global impact from iraq. you start the book with a very revealing story about colin powell who came to you after the invasion and it looked like

americans might be about to find weapons of mass destruction and mr. powell said to you with a big smile on his face you write, they have made an honest man of me. what did he mean? >> guest: i can understand that and i think basically he made the case for weapons of mass destruction in iraq and for a while we couldn't find any, and so if they had as they thought they had it was the indication that finally we found something and it was more of a relief. >> host: do you think he was -- to make a case he did not believe in? >> guest: i'm not sure i can say that but obviously he had stature. he had a very high reputation and was extremely well-liked by the international community and all of the foreign ministers said some time ago he had

incredible credibility. >> do you feel the presentation to the united nations which was so quizzical in making the bush administrations case in invading iraq was the presentation justified? >> i think from what we have seen there were no weapons of mass destruction and i'm not sure that with or without that presentation the bush administration wouldn't have gone to war anyway. i think they had decided to go. >> host: you are quite pointed in your criticism of america when it comes to the war in iraq. he writes much of the global community was that america was enraged and vengeful. >> that is correct. immediately after 9/11 you will recall that there was an incredible outpouring of support for the u.s.. we had rallies all around the

world. >> host: we are all americans. >> guest: we are all americans and i recall not long after that they did a piece, why do they hate us? and i said to my coeditor who was is very said michael that is the wrong question. the right question will be we have to remain friends. why did we lose them? what happened? but there was a fear that the superpower u.s. was lashing out and anyone may get into trouble and people were scared, scared of america, scared to speak up and to say what they believed in. i could see the struggle around the world talking to them which was unfortunate because the u.s. had done so much to create the u.n., so much for human rights and democracy and to suddenly

find us in that situation was an awkward one. >> host: when we write a book we choose which -- to put in it and we choose which word to repeat in it and the fact that you chose to point out that criticism albeit from a global community and to use the word enraged and vengeful, is that what you felt the america? is that what you felt america was acting like it is that what you felt was driving america? >> let me put it this way, they were so determined to take action that i am not sure they were ready to listen and they were ready to listen to other views from friends as well as from foes. and when you you're in that situation you do make mistakes. you also do provoke others. >> host: just in the past three days bishop desmond tutu

has called for george bush and -- to answer to the criminal court in the hague for weapons of mass destruction. would she go far as to support the archbishops call? >> guest: i think men in leadership make many decisions. they get some right. they get some wrong and some decisions are monumental. they and decision to go into iraq was a hugely important and the impact is there for all of us to see. they obviously have to live with the consequences of those decisions and history will judge them. history will judge and i think i would want to -- and men who have done some very positive things in other aspects, bush and blair but they got iraq wrong in my judgment but i think we should leave

history to judge. >> host: you don't think that's the case for the international criminal court? >> guest: in fact i do see a case and i don't think the court itself will take any action. no, i wouldn't go that far. >> host: reading a chapter on iraq i kept thinking what is the role of the secretary general because you worked with him at the time and i wonder whether you saw your position as a team doctor or referee? in terms of america and the security council? >> guest: i think it was a bit of both and more than that because when the organization or the security council in particular -- the secretary-general's rules become the secretary-general has to keep working to bring the community together to get them

to work together to find a solution. it is normal in any human endeavor to have issues. what is important is to find the leadership to pull people together to identify the common interest and move forward to work on them. so as secretary-general, even when you are engaged in action by a group of members and you are criticizing, yes you should speak out but you should also know that you have to remain viable to be able to replay the conciliatory role to be able to play the role of bringing the two sides together after the fight is over. >> host: that is very tricky. you are forfeiting some of your credit of so the people you criticize. >> guest: you sometimes have to explain to them, i knew that the war was going to lead to

major disaster. it's easy to wind the war but winning the peace is even more challenging. i was also conscious that we are going to be leaders when it came to peace, when he came to building the peace, when it came to picking up the pieces after the war and that is what happened. the organization felt they had an obligation to help the iraqi people regain and retain their sovereignty and determine what their future and would would be so when the conflict gave us a mandate to help we all went in to try and see what we could do. obviously, we had some tragic consequences but some of our best men and women that we had to do it. the secretary-general in these situations is very very tricky. you have to navigate it. >> host: during the long week when you're pushing for a

resolution and so much attention was focused on you and you realize that america is really pushing for this war, what was going through your mind personally? i mean, how frustrating was that? >> guest: what was going through my mind was, is this war unavoidable? must we have this war? and i was also informed by a lot of leaders around the world, in latin america and in africa with president bush and blair, and i was really against the war with every fiber of my being and wondering, how do we stop this? it became obvious that it was unstoppable. but i was relieved that the council did not give approval for the war. it would have been a disaster for the united nations. i know that the time americans

were upset that the u.n. and the council had not supported the war but i think today many americans understand why and perhaps appreciate the council and the u.n. took the right decision. >> host: what was the tone of your conversations with president bush at the end there? >> guest: he was determined to take action. he was determined to ensure that saddam hussein does not give the u.n. and international community the run around anymore, so he was absolutely determined. he was taking the right decision. >> host: was he angry? >> guest: no, he was -- but i wouldn't say he was angry in the cumbre stations with me.

>> host: let's talk about peacekeeping. it something you have spent a lot of time in the book on as well and it's something you have spent a lot of time on in your career before you were secretary-general. you were head of the peacekeeping operation. a review of your book by "the washington post" by david ignatius called your book to study in the failure of a noble idea. has had a fair characterization of the united nations peacekeeping operation? >> i would have chosen different words, but some of the points he makes, perhaps i could ask the question when we talk of the united nations in this context, who are we talking about? is that the member states who take the decisions, who give us a mandate, who give us the resources to carry out the

mandate or sometimes not give us the resources to carry out the mandate or we are talking of the secretariat and the secretary-general? the u.n. is us, your government and mind and it can be as powerful as these governments want it to be. and sometimes we talk about the u.n. as they distance themselves by doing that. given the governments who are ultimately responsible for action or inaction and some of these situations, an alibi, an alibi and blaming the secretariat in the secretary-general. one of my predecessors used to say that we often refer to the secretary-general as sg for short and since sg doesn't stand for secretary general, it's for scapegoat. [laughter] >> host: you were the

scapegoat in chief. >> guest: exactly. it was the scapegoat function of the u.n. fed the member states in the media have to be very careful not to downplay it so much that we wouldn't be useful as an alibi because really when we talk of the failures of somalia, of rwanda, of bosnia, and i try to state in the book the difficulties we have, we made mistakes in the secretary of. we could have done things differently, but in the investigations that i have done on rwanda and also lost me at and were wanted in particular the overwhelming reason for failure is lack of will to act and to intervene

i'm taking time to answer questions because i believe in somalia when president bush's father went in, thousands of soldiers -- hungry somalis. he did it at the time of the elections. the soldiers went in and did whatever they could and of course the somalis were resisting and sometimes you have food and warehouses but you couldn't get it to the people so they came and broke the logjam so we could feed people. and then they had thrown in the operation, the blackhawk showdown and we withdrew the troops but the true's which left somalia were not just the u.s. troops. almost every western government went through their troops so the

best armed troops in somalia in the end collapse and we had to close it down. this was the end of 93. in the beginning of 94, the spring of 94 we had rwanda. and governments go through this mact they become risk-averse. nobody is ready to send in additional troops into the situation. >> host: you write in the book that and were wanted they had been watching somalia. >> guest: in fact one of the rebel fighters in somalia and rwanda took our peacekeeping information and said -- [inaudible] they killed 10 belgian shoulders and the belgian battalion was withdrawn and the sri lankans gave instructions to their soldiers to protect only themselves. pope paul wrote me a letter that

the commander was left with several hundred men to do his work with the whole nation and the systematic genocide going on. but we couldn't get the troops. some governments claimed they did not know it was happening but then i asked them, what did they do when they found out it was happening? they sent in planes to the internationals and allow them to -- but in the end they blamed the u.n.. we all need to find a better way of tackling these and of course somalia, rwanda, bosnia, the experiences that i lived through mark to me and that was one of the reasons why i felt as an international community we needed to find a way of tackling

these better and that led to the responsibility to protect the country. >> host: talk a little bit whereabouts, the specific cases. you have an extraordinary account in the book in january january 1994, receiving a cable from an informant in rwanda who basically told you what was going to happen, and it did happen. so the idea that things take us by surprise and we don't know what's happening, you have the information and you yourself spend time calling heads of government to ask for more troops. >> guest: yes. general delay who was the force commander met with an informant who claimed at the time to have information that there is a plan to kill the tutsis and there was some massive amounts of arms caches that he knew had been collected and that he could take

that to the location. delay thought about it and thought maybe he should go and do it. leave the headquarters advised him to be careful, that you don't have the mandate and you don't have the means. sometimes it's one of the most difficult decisions for a peacekeeper. he can make a stand now, but if you have limited resources and the others call for reinforcements, there is nothing you can do and in that situation, given the somali example, if he had also taken undue risk and soldiers have been killed the force would have withdrawn and in fact he lost two-thirds of his force when this happened. and so it wasn't because the -- he didn't have the mandate. it was a realistic assessment of

the appetite of member states to take out these kinds of crises and honestly i don't think we would have had the resources we needed to go in and so we told him to be careful. >> host: in retrospect when you look at row one and i'm sure you think about this a lot because in your book you said is something that mark ii, 100,000 people massacred in three months. in retrospect is there something different you could have done? >> guest: i think one area that we discussed at that time, the u.n. was very shy of the media. we could have used the media to put pressure on the governments to offer resources, not that we would necessarily have received them but we could have used the media and shouted from the rooftops to tell what was

happening. i don't think it would have had that much impact on the people in rwanda but the people outside of rwanda may have said, we cannot sit back. let's do something. something would have been, i do not know. >> host: when you spoke to the government with the heads of state and rwanda was starting to unfold, you knew the massacre was happening, what was that they said to you, their reason for not giving troops? >> guest: i spoke to the ambassador so often the reason is that first evolved we will think about it and people come back, which invariably meant no. we don't have the resources or we are overstretched and we don't have the men to go in. and you never really got a

positive response you needed to be able to build a force and in fact at that time i had a canadian military adviser in the department of peacekeeping, and we had come up with a system that we called the standby forces arrangement where we had approached each government to ask, in a time of crisis, if we were to approach you, what would you do? what would you give? some said we would give battalion or they said a field hospital where they said we will give you an armored troll cars, so i told him and he came back to me and said, sir, we tested the system. it's very effective. it worked well. i said what were the results? he said we got a quick know. at least we know that we are

getting nothing was his reaction. and of course, these are their men. if they don't want to give them to you, there's nothing we can do it all so fake u.n., -- and the sense that and we borrowed the troops at that time and perhaps doesn't increase very much, we repay the government $1000 per man or woman for that. but it cost the government for a five times are eight times as much. >> host: in a sense less than what you have described in somalia and then raimondo get to the heart of what david ignatius writes about in the sense that there is no -- the times when u.n. peacekeepers are needed or called for by

their very nature the times when a superpower doesn't feel it has been a key national security interests to intervene and therefore they are always going to be seen and slightly marginal cases in terms of national security interest. but can it ever work when you're asking these countries and when they feel it's not something they have to intervene for? >> guest: you are right. before the collapse of the wall, when gorbachev had the system we have a situation where most of the peacekeepers came from countries outside the members of the security council because there was a sense that if you brought them and you might politicize the operations. after 89, some of them participated in these peacekeeping operations which was in some cases helpful because they had the best trained, well-equipped men and

women that could do this job. the peacekeeper is usually a world trained soldier. a world trained soldier is the only one who can do it effectively. when these powerful countries are being threatened, they are able to put together a coalition, sometimes under the u.n. flag, to go in and at. where they have no interest as was initially described is precisely what happened. in fact, the u.n. used to describe some crises as orphaned, orphaned in the sense that they have no -- this is a powerful country and they lead the fight. they lead the fight for peacekeepers to go in. they lead the fight to put a coalition of the women to go in and where there is no real national interest, you don't

say, and this is why what bush senior did was quite extraordinary and clinton followed in somalia because it was really no national interest but compassion and on humanitarian grounds that propelled them to go in. >> host: we will talk about bosnia and africa and more of the book in just a moment, kofi anon but we are going to take a quick break. >> guest: thank you. >> host: mr. annan before the break we were talking about raimondo in somalia and whether in cases where there is not a national security interests of

the major power you talked about orphan crisis and where the u.n. peacekeeping crisis had a true champion and of course a year and a half after the massacre we have -- was bosnia little different because it was at the heart of europe and there was more of a security interest of european powers to get involved. >> guest: you are absolutely right. lazio was a friend and bosnia have the attention. bosnia had the forces required that for want to did not have. there were issues between the member states but at the different kind. the europeans had deployed troops to the u.n. peacekeeping and subsequently through nato. mella fitch was a cynical and brutal man and had taken u.n.

peacekeepers hostage and this really unnerved the government and was also another aspect of peacekeeping. we did not prepare the population for the possibility that there could be risks. and the give the impression that it's always risk-free so when you get into these situations where either some art killed or taken hostage, the population gets. offset and the politicians panic and often say bring the bodies home. so that weakness in the peacekeeping operation if it's a national effort, they don't do that. they will take the casualties and attacks sometimes even reinforce the troops so they can get their work done. but in bosnia, what happened was at one stage when it became clear that firm action needed to be taken against the bosnians

serb army, the governments with troops on the ground mainly the europeans did not want to use their power because they felt they could put their men and women to play their address. the u.s. which had no troops on the ground wanted to use -- and this led to a long stand until that was resolved or contact to remember one of the u.n. commanders, a frenchman, in an interview saying we need troops now in the u.s. is saying they will come when there is peace. this is not very courageous and this made my good friend madeleine albright absolutely -- and in fact it was not correct for him but that was the sort of tension and the feeling that existed at that the time. when the issue was resolved in their power was brought to bear here roque the back of the serbian army and eventually led

to the dayton peace talks with the secretary and richard holbrooke who pushed for the settlement. >> host: we had in july of 1995 the forces of united nations peacekeepers who stood by and let it happen. >> guest: i would not use the phrase united nations peacekeepers stood by and let it happen. we had dutch companies, rather small group. this was part of the problem. in the sense that i was very much involved. when they started talking of establishing safe areas, i had my commanders do a study. a study of what would be required to make that save area truly safe. there were two things they suggested.

one, it would have to be wide enough in diameter to get it outside, beyond the range so that they cannot come in and attack the people. second, it would require 34,600 troops. the member states were having none of that. in fact, they changed the mandate and there was no protection or anything in it. they established a safe area and a bonnet the weakest option to the weakest option of 7600, for the areas and when you do that, you are not able and the diameter was not wide enough. they didn't have enough resources to do it properly and the peacekeepers, and there were several areas that agreed so that peacekeepers who were there

in srebrenica really could not stand up and could not defend themselves much less the local population. >> host: they made a mockery of the idea. >> guest: i wouldn't argue with that and this is the other point i was going to make. in effect, if you say that you are bringing in people to protect you and we have a safe haven, the sense that people get is, finally we are going to be safe. there's a safe haven. the u.n. troops are here and nothing will happen. to allow that expectation to stand rather than being realistic and lowering tax dictation and explaining to the people in the public what we can do and not do his part of the

problem with u.n. peacekeepers. i saw it in the middle east and in lebanon. when you put a u.n. patrol here it becomes a village because people gather around. >> host: in the case of srebrenica you don't think peacekeepers could have done anything more than they did? >> guest: they did not have the resources. they could have fought but they didn't have the sort of weapons that are required to outgun and out drive them. >> host: but when its own government had its own commission, the whole government -- [inaudible] >> guest: it was an impossible situation to put those troops

in. i used to talk to a lot of the commanders and i think i have made this point earlier, where they would say yes we can stand in fact and take them on today. let's say you have a thousand dutch shoulders and they come with reinforcements of 10,000 tomorrow and they have no means of getting reinforcements. another time the cover wasn't that effective so the commander sometimes make judgments that we on the outside may not agree with but we also know the mandate, what is important is when we are going to take on these operations we should go in when the necessary -- with the necessary force to be able to get the worked in. work done. in fact and peacekeeping we have a theory that you sometimes have to show force in order not to

use force. i mean for example when the u.s. went into somalia, they arrived massively with all their resources. there was no way the somali rebels were going to take them on, so you show force in order not to use force but the u.n. often doesn't have that force even to show. we don't have force to get the essential work done and the story i was going to tell was in srebrenica we got the minimum, for the safe areas we got the minimum resources required and the mandate was defined to read the peacekeepers should use their presence to dissuade attacks on the enclaves and they argued we haven't asked you to protect them because we know we don't need them i believe and

this is why we have chosen our words very carefully. usurp presence to dissuade. they are so well-behaved, so gentlemanly, they won't shoot. >> host: you stand by the dutch peacekeeping offers and that was there? you don't think that they should have done more than they did? >> guest: i really do not see how much more they could have done. in fact in hindsight people comes up with all sorts of things. they should have done and they could have done. they could have fought and taken great risk for themselves and i'm sure they would have done it if they were assured of reinforcement and the force on the horizon that will come to their aid.

>> guest: . >> host: a lot of the incident -- incidents we talked about earlier for events that happened in africa. you talk about the lack of institution and the impact of the military regime but you also write, africans would not be able to -- by voices as easily as they cut others. could others. do you think your words had a lasting impact? >> guest: yes, can give me some examples. my first summit of the african union, it was an organization of african states, was in harare. it was in harare that i decided one should talk very clearly and openly to the african leaders and the africans about the role of the military and governance and suggested to them that we should not encourage coup d'état

's and we should not welcome those who take by force and they have to respect the rule of law. two years later that became a rule in the african union, that they will not accept people who come to power by force or current fact i recall one of the leaders saying, in every game you have rules and if you misbehave we show you a red card. we should show these guys the red cards and not welcome them here. in it had a real impact. they immediately said we are going to -- we do not intend to stay and they are prevented from joining the other heads of states. this is an example of that i thought the u.n. would follow and make it universal. we never went that route but it least it has happened in fact in

africa. i also made some statements on governance on human rights, respectful rule of law which in a way has empowered civil society. civil society can quote me and not go to jail. if they made a statement track it by themselves, they get into trouble and so i felt with the robust society in africa one should empower them and encourage them to speak out, to put pressure on the governance to respect the rule of law and human rights and we have seen off the progress and we have seen some very good ngos on the continent. so i think in that way,, i can speak frankly to them and most

of the time they listen. >> host: did you ever have frank conversations with secretary-general robert mugabe? >> guest: i met mugabe on many occasions. we talked about african politics. we talked about other issues. we talked about the fight against hiv and i remember trying to encourage him to get the people to use because zimbabwe really was hit by the epidemic and he was quite religious. he was trained in the jesuit school and to reassure him i said i have braces with the pope and i think he should think about it. and he said, mr. secretary-general, when it comes to that pope and i are one. and he would not budget the time

but the zimbabweans are doing better now. there was another head of state who might try to encourage to speak out on hiv/aids because there was such silence on the issue and get it was a situation where silence meant death. i said we should speak out and educate and encourage them to speak about contraception and increase their programs. he said i'm the father of the nation. i cannot go out and speak to my people about contraception. speak to them and encourage them to be promiscuous. he would not budge. >> host: part of your role as united nations secretary-general or more broadly the global -- to what mugabe would say, it's time for you to leave office. your people are suffering under your rule.

do you see yourself as having that kind of a role in the world? could you have that kind of a role? >> guest: know, no, and spoken to mugabe or other leaders about the future, about the time to move on, but i cannot ascribe to myself the authority or the power to say, you leave office. as the secretary-geral or even today i cannot advise. i spoke to one neighborhood and around for a long time. i can talk in terms of look around you, see what is happening in north africa and the middle east. there are strong transitional winds blowing that cannot be resisted and resisted for a long and you should think of the future. you should think of when you were born and what you are you're going to do next. i can discuss it with them in that context but i cannot know

and say, you must leave. you must resign. after all, i didn't -- they were voted into office and i made a general statement about a democratic rotation, so in those kinds of discussions i can pound the table and demand that they quit. call-in. ..

>> and really create problems for everyone. i felt i had to try. i did my best. in the end, i had to let go because the government was in transit -- it intransigent and it was

divided in the security council that gave me money was divided. i tried very hard to bring them together. meeting in geneva does the 30th of june, bringing together the permanent members of the security council. kuwait, iraq, qatar and the secretary general of the league of arab states and the u.s.. we came to an agreement. you need political transition. that meant an interim government to ensure

security forces with top-notch of leadership so that you don't have chaotic collapse. but that means the is on his way out. the difference is c. hess to read the avoid the process. i have thought they would come to new york and build on it. instead they got into discussions on the 19th of june and it has not been endorsed. >> host: do you worry with the peace plan they offered a fig leaf that was in the

process of negotiating but to carry on killing people? >> guest: that is what some people say. i believe the elements have to be implemented as we go sooner or later. it was designed to end the pilots for the thousands who are imprisoned three access to humanitarian help to create an environment to the does to political discussions. first of all,, i came one year after the conflict started.

i am sure they will say the same. what is it that should have been done or could have been done in by the international community that what stopped us from doing? if we had a concerted support the pressure of the parties we could have chance support and pressure from the united community. >> host: but the united -- international community was never united. russia would not put pressure in the sense it was

set up to fail. that gave an excuse am bought time that he could cut -- carry on to kill the citizens. >> i am not sure you are entirely right. i know the argument to. many people even today aeronaut interested in negotiations with the diplomatic effort. they only see us solution as the military one. waiting for an open -- innovation. that is one option. we need to be careful it is one individual. even if assad would leave today we would have a lot of problems to do with in syria. my approach is the security

council planned that all five members sign-on to to put pressure on the party's when the cease-fire went into force both sides stopped fighting. then the violence when it down 80% what did the country's fourth tried to do to put pressure on to go along with a cease-fire? if it is not a serious political transition plan

that will not be enough. i should not say so much about syria when someone else is doing the job i should not complicate things he is if brilliant mediator and a wise man in the gets the support from the security council he could make a difference. >> host: that is a very big f and. >> gas. >> host: talking about the arab spurring he remained pessimistic about the changes taking place in the middle east. you can point* to bahrain, egypt what makes you optimistic? >> the optimism comes from the fact for the first time in decades the people in the country stand up their

government and to say i firmly believe health the balanced societies are built on peace and stability and development and growth. and the third is respect for rule of law and human-rights. you cannot have long term development without stability and have stability vice versa of. but they have to be routed in the rule of law and respected by human-rights. we intended in the past including the u.s. dealing with these nations it is a

stable country. then rego economically. but we forget the third. that is what the people are demanding. in the end they persist and work with each other to build a healthy society. >> do think it is a lack of the appearance that perhaps has made peace in the bill least? as a huge part as a secretary general. >> in the sense to take nine allies said everyone

approaches the problem very soft a there was a tendency to focus signed changes and the stability and then they talk about rule of law and human-rights. their wrists so much in that region because of sensitivity because of the era spring has opened the door and the government is speaking much more broadly. >> host: when you criticize the united states to have a reflexive reaction with utilization of the united nations i they stand

eight in the way of the board your peace effort? >> i can say it will require a sustained and determined effort by the u.s. to bring about peace in the region. it has not been sustained to say there is uh peace process today both look to you as leadership when president clinton tried to

get the solution but since then we have not been that close. there are people would now begin to wonder if the two state solution is not evaporating on a questionable basis. >> host: to talk about "war and peace" looking back at your career with globally fares is there more war or more piece? >> in terms of forests there are fewer civil wars today man in the past but we have other problems.

rehab internationally organized crime and weapons of mass destruction we have health issues end they can fly around the world very quickly. there are fewer wars but many of the problems that we need to do with in addition that do not exist here not totally sure to seven kofi annan thank you for joining us. >> guest: they give.